Andrea Amato
 

FREE FROM THE WORLD, FREE IN THE WORLD

I.  THE ORIGINAL CONDITION AND THE WORLDLY CONDITION OF FREEDOM

To reflect adequately on the original conditon of freedom one must start from an analysis of fundamental processes of man. 

In the relationship with the world, the original freedom can be carried back to the innate tendencey in the drive to be expressed, or of the organ to function ,or to the tendency to explore and to prove oneself. This tendency is free and is fundamental because, in any case, it would activate, even independently of any external solicitation, and because it orignally presents itself as indifferentiated and, therefore, unprovided with any structure or schematism, being released of any organization.

So that, the original freedom, in so far as undifferentiated and unconditioned, professes to possess all potentialities and to be able to gather all potentialities, but, as soon as it establishes the first relationships between impulses and between these and the external reality, it loses its characteristics of indifferentiation and of absolute “unconditionalness”, beginning to schematize itself and to schematize the world.  Initially, its effective power consisted in the casualty of its first relations, that, exactly because of this, were boundless.  Once projected in the world, the freedom can only aspire to enlarge its potentialities, which can only take place if it amplifies its relations with the world.

At this point, that is, its possibility to rise will remain unconditional, in the sense that the freedom, by this time, defines itself as a property of man, which can activate itself in any moment, even if from this it doesn’t ensue that it inevitably activates itself at any moment, nor that it always activates itself according to predetermined modalities and according to fixed finalities, unchanging, absolute.

Instead, the concrete manifestation of freedom which depends on the historical situation or on its particular existential course will be conditioned.  History of man and personal history, in turn, can be marked, again, by a strong emotional condition, such to solicit freedom and the planned decision of man.

In short, freedom its original condition irreparably lost, can no longer rise in absolute independance compared to our individual history, just like it can no longer manifest itself in absolute autonomy from the world.

In his worldly relationships, in general man moves between the two poles of plasticity and of stabilization.  The prevalence of one or of the other aspect depends on a dispositon of the individual.  It too, however, acquires gradually and existentially.  This can also be upset at any  moment, but soon will return to consolidate, maybe in new forms.  The same mental mechanisms are guided by a two-fold principle of adaptation and of economy.  That is to say that in themselves they include the transformation and the stabilization.  An affirmation of this kind is found in Einstein as well, who associates, “from a logical point of view,” the “arbitrariness” of the “conceptual systems” “to the largest possible economy of their independent elements from a logical point of view (fundamental concepts and axioms), namely some non-defined concepts and some non-derived propositions”. [1]

These interior processes substantiate the essence of freedom and place themselves as preliminary and propaedeutical to its very practice.  They, namely, constitute the condition both of the concrete expression of the entire anthropologic and personal structure of man, and of the effective expression of his activities.  Such an essence, however, can subsist only if and only in so far as it really is in a position to manifest itself and to carry itself out, thus to constitute itself as disposition of man.  Likewise, only a free society encourages and reinforces the propensity for freedom, typical of the individual.  So that, freedom and its practice are among themselves in a close relationship, if not grounding, at least constitutive. 

In the relationship with the world, the exercise of freedom on man’s part expresses his ability to modify the modality, the rythyms and times of transformation particular to nature. Thus, from a practical point of view, the freedom of man perform in the world and by means of the world through the possibility of a continuos remodelling of the respective relationships of strength, or, to the contrary, in a renunciation, more or less partial, to all this.  On an existential ground, however, its free action manifests itself as capability to differentiate the ends and to differ their concrete realization, with consequent pursuit of an accord of theirs within a continuity of life.

This differentiation of ends rests on the possibility of pursuing the same end in different situations and conditions, so that variants and multiple behavioural and instrumental adaptations of it could be found.  All which presupposes that the same end is proposed in diverse contexts, that is that it expands exploratorally in a large and diversified world, being sustained in this by an energetic preinvestment sufficiently endowed and, at the same time, flexible.

Existentially, our freedom takes shape, so, in a choice between different possibilities, so that we express some preferences, or some priorities, on the basis of which several occasions or ends become placed before others.  When we choose, or when we plan, at the same time we limit the field of our effective utilizations and we defer other ends, maybe likewise desirable   Therefore, we impose a constraint on ourselves  Of this capacity of regulation, of this discipline and of this dominion of oneselves often we are glad, as Kant and Nietzsche say.

The world too, from its part, initially, in response to the uncontrollable propulsion towards exteriority, gives itself as totality immediately available, of which nothing prejudically escapes from the contact, from the perception and from the relationship with man.

Man, thus, places his very freedom both in an interior tension and in an effective and wide practicability of the surrounding reality.  For these characteristics, freedom never closes itself in complete interiority, but it immediately establishes itself in the world, even if that must not let us forget or diminish the reciprocal automony of the factors in play.

With these characteristics, freedom always refers to a relationship between inside and out and to their mutable positions of strength. In reality, it is exactly the connection between interiority and exteriority and the consequent ascertainment of a reciprocal effectiveness, of the exteriority on my sensibility and my interiority on the outside world, that concretely allows my power to manifest itself and, therefore, my freedom.  Realism of thought and realism of liberty, at this level, proceed at the same pace.  Consequently, there is no thought without freedom, and there is not freedom without a power of mine (which meets with a substantial agreement with the world.)  If my freedom is able to produce effects (remember the indissociable act-effect link), then it is real.

Precisely this recognition of a subjective strength allows the active and conscious practice of freedom.  In this way, we realize that we can decide autonomously, and we assign a fundamental value to freedom in itself, even before it specifies in whatever content or in whatever action.

Wielding such power, we acquire a disposition, that from now on will be able to be activated indifferently, both from our initiative, and from solicitation from the world.  Both processes require a relationship with exteriority, such to specify a posteriori free choice, indeterminate in itself.

If, therefore, man, this being initially weak and not well-defined, succeeds in competing with the overwhelming power of the world, this is due to two important circumstances:

a)              to the fact that the exploring push presents itself in the first place as undifferentiated strength, void of particular finalities and regulated only by several general rules, like those of alternation and of economy, which makes it more attractive, because it is more fluid, more expansive, more capable of extending itself to wide zones of peripheral and central nervous system, so much as to make it become more suitable to gather energy from areas of the body, even sensibly distant;

b)             to the abstract possibility for man to refer himself to an entire world and, for this reason, place himself as catalyst of a set of availability and of usableness, so that he presents himself as the little energy capable to relate himself to the big energy of the totality of the world.

If freedom constitutes a fundamental condition of man, nevertheless his definition and his concrete realization have a historic character.  Historic in two senses:  the sense that his effective conditions are historic and consist, at same time, of a set of possibilities, of necessities, of limits; in the sense that his definition is subject to the historic evolution of the relationship between individual and society and to the division of the respective tasks.

Freedom, therefore, from one side places itself as freedom in the world, given that it continuously defines itself in relation  to the concretely attemptable relationships in the world and with the world.  On the other hand, it places itself as freedom as regards to the world, from the moment that man, in transcendence, overcomes the phenomenic and the pure necesssity to decide his own role and his own finalities.

So that, a connnection is established between metaphysic freedom, considered in itself, concrete and contingent freedom, freedom structured in our consolidated way of being and of placing ourselves.  It deals with a multi-directional relationship, that can proceed from the metaphysical to the mundane and the personal, or in the opposite direction.  In every case, this very complex  interrelation makes possible:  the acknowledgement of freedom itself; its planning manifestation; its communicability and comparability.

Yet, it can also occur that our freedom releases itself completely from whatever determined content and places itself as strength in itself, capable of directing any experience, starting only with the expression of a totally free intention.  In such a case, the individual assumes the responsability of deciding, but considers a successive qualification and verification of the initial decision superfluous.  Freedom, at this point, becomes purely formal and delights in the discovery of a power, considered a priori and totally released from the relationship with the world, so much so that, in the conviction of its absolute character, does not want to humiliate itself in the shattering of its power in ulterior particular choices.  The decisive choice, then precludes each successive determinate choice and, in the concrete relationship with multiform reality, formal and absolute liberty does not accept being contradicted.  Hegel, to such ends, speaks of moral law that “doesn’t have a universal content,” because a content of the kind inevitably would have to subject itself to determination, and asserts that, as a result of such a “renunciation” of “an absolute content,” “the command can only have formal universality, that is it can only not contradict itself.  Formal universality, in fact, is the universality void of content . . .”. [2]

A freedom of the kind advances a universalistic pretence, such to subsume beneath itself whatever content and particular experiences that should present themselves later on, in the course of existence; that is, it proposes to interpret and to direct the future, without, nevertheless, having ever had to do with preceding content and experiences, it goes to say without ever having been compared to the determination and having had experience in the first place itself.  In this sense, one can talk about future with past, that is, totally abstract and, for the most part, absolute.

However, to the extent that we aspire for absolute freedom, we will continuouly find it fragile, because the absolute opposes the contingent, conflicts with it and, as Hegel foresees, fails.

In this case, it deals with an interiority in itself closed, that advances the pretence of already possessing in itself all the particularities and, therefore, it presents itself as total and totalizing.  It, thus, manifests the profound vice of subjectivism, which does not oppose the world only if and when it succeeds in submitting to it.

This liberation-from-something manifests  a power of freedom and, at the same time, the freedom itself, seen in its absolute form. Hegel calls the power of freedom will, so that between will and freedom such a strict connection is established that from now on it will be impossible to separate one from the other.  This freedom is, of course, capability of decision, but, for Hegel, the decision, however much taken in the interiority, must be expressed and must pass through the world, in order that the freedom demonstrates itself absolute.

In this way, the moral power of Hegel becomes effective and not simply phenomentally hypothetical, as happens with Kant, who always distinguishes the real man from the saint.

Substantially, Kant poses the question of subsistence of an unconditionalness a priori, previous and independant from the relationship with the world.

On the contrary, Jaspers reconducts the authenticity of freedom to the  unforeseeability of man [3].

This aspect is undeniable. It resides in the free play of the faculties and in its relationship with the variety in the world, so that historicity or phenomenology and anthropology meet and establish a relationship.  In this encounter, the newness can be found or brought, according to what man is promoter or interlocutor.

When we find or bring the innovation, we become solicited to express one of our potentials and, with that, our freedom, or we solicit the environment to express its potentials.  The relationship, from this point of view, entails, inevitably, not only the acknowledgement of the novelty, but, in some measure, also of the reciprocal transformation.  Now, since none of the factors entered in contact alienates itself completely from the other, the transformation also entails a rediscussion of themselves, to the light of the datity met and of its structuring.  Freedom, in other words, meets necessity and confronts itself with it.

But if such a mechanism eludes our instantaneous comprehension, this does not mean that it is arbitary, that is completely disengaged from the conditions in which it rises and from our own consolidated individuality.  The choice is not arbitrary, neither regarding the antecedents of its content, nor regarding the methods with which it becomes taken, which have sedimented and structured little by little, precisely with the continuous assumption of decisions.  The articulation of such methods constitutes itself for the most part in a subconscious way, that contributes in accentuating their mysterious character.  But, in reality, they derive from a concrete and assiduous trade with exteriority and in the continuous anthropologic interchange.

To these motivations, in order of the comprehensibility of the human manifestations, the possibility of a return to the decisons taken is added, be it even in a moment and be it even not in full awareness.  A possibility that not even Jaspers excludes, who, even though confirming “the free origin” of the choice, recognizes that “in it I am responsible for myself, and, from the outside, I am made responsible of the objective consequences that derive from my acting”. [4]

This possiblity of the retrospection of the decision or of the action rests in the last analysis on the very tendency to manifest itself, on the part of any faculty, even in the purest interiority.

In fact, the manifestation, in itself, assumes a language, of which it is possible to attempt a deciphering.  Moreover, the recognization of the faculties and of their processes takes place because these, in the course of time, tend to assume a regularity and a stabilization.  For this reason, the fact that many of these processes take place in an unconscious or subconscious manner, eluding our first comprehension and valuation, does not mean that they are more fluid, nor that they are impalpable.  On the other hand, as Jaspers reminds us, on occasion, if it is not us intentionally proposing the retrospection of our decisions, it can be the world and others or the effects of our decisionsimposing us to do it.

II  - THE MODERN CONDITION OF THE FREEDOM

The examination of the modern condition of freedom sends us again to the relationship between individual and society.  To such purpose, it must be pointed out that the margins of freedom or of tollerance that society attributes to the individual,  in general, depend on the degree of security which society enjoys.  A more secure society is, therefore, more tollerant, while a restless society is inclined to intolerance and to dogmatism.  In particular, the receptiveness of a society derives from the valuation that society makes of problems that it faces, of the means of which it arranges to oppose them, of the type of relationship that society establishes between risks and prospects.  Modern society presents a noteworthy degree of tollerance compared to the past, both because it believes to be able to support a larger number of requests and of differences, and because it recognizes that predictable dangers at least counterbalance the advantages, if they are not absolutely outclassed by the potentialities offered.  Today, however, facing the worsening of tensions, at the emerging of new difficulties, at the urgency of some problems, the spirit of tollerance shown by society with respect to the individual risks being put back in discussion.

Moreover, the passage of certain decisions from the category of obligation to that of choice involves a certain increase of instability.  Scarpelli, to such purpose, considers the question of compulsoriness of sexual services in the ambit of the married couple and observes how today the consideration of such services in their quality of gift is widespread.  The gift, however, says Scarpelli, “always has something occasional and ephemeral…”, so that  “the marriage does not comes out of it… rienforced”. [5]  Analogous valutations are developed by Singer with regard to abortion and to passive euthanasia.  The Australian scholar, in fact, asks himself “if  the diffuse acceptance’ of such practices” has not already revealed a leak in the traditional ethic, making it as such a very weak defence against those who lack respect for individual life.”  The auspice of  “a more convincing ethic” and “of a more solid ethic” does no other than point out a difference, ever more diffuse today, between stabilizing behaviours and less stabilizing behaviours, even if not necessarily destabilizing. [6]

The increase of the possibilities, then, attenuates the stability of each of them; and yet compared to that a pure and simple turning back is unthinkable.  Between the undiscussed stability of the past and the instability of the present we should seek a riskier stability, namely such to admit doubt, the afterthought, the search of the new, the reconsideration of new experiences and their comparison with previous situations.

A redefinition of relationships between individual and society is thus imposed.  Let’s consider, to such purpose, the case exposed by Scarpelli regarding the trading of organs destined for transplants.  Here the problem is laid out that if, in spite of the consent of the interested party, society musn’t intervene to impede a market of the kind. [7] The availability of one’s own body should be included in the full autonomy of the individual and, yet, it opposes a fundamental principle of society, that of the inalienability of the body, in so far as integrant part of the person.  As one sees, in this case, society affirms its power of command that goes against the will of the individual, even though its behaviour does not harm others, but, on the contrary, favours their well-being.  With this society proclaims the universality of a moral norm, so much to prevail on a right of the individual to dispose of himself.  This very universal presupposition permits the laying same limits to personal freedom, which so loses its absolute inviolability and incompressability, even if  it is defended and respected in line of principle.  To admit the existence of a certain nucleus of fundamental principles, in fact, involves the recognition of a possible limitation of personal freedom.  Evidently, however, society cannot exhibit this essential moral without a valid justification and without possessing a strong consent.  Also for a society an obligation to the legitimization of its acts subsists when the universality of a principle becomes contested in some way by sociologically relevant behaviours, that is relatively diffused and knowlingly sustained.  In this case, the universality can no longer be presupposed but must be conquered and justified.

All this can also take place because the desires and the freedom of the individual in the modern epoch have become much larger.  From this point of view, one can speak of enlarged individuality.  So that the extension of the individual expectations has coincided and, at the same time, given a new foundation to a private ambit, in itself given to removing itself from social regulation.

In particular, in certain social levels the very mode of placing oneself with respect to society alters and changes the very statute of the requests that they propose in regard of society. From this, after all, nothing is asked, towards it needs are simply manifested.  Nothing is asked because the interiority is split from the exteriority, both in the sense that one presumes to be able to be well (or fairly well) to prescind from the social situation or independently from social intervention;  and, to the contrary, in the sense that one does not place much faith in the action of this society and/or of society as such.  Also because of this, from the category of rights we pass to that of needs.  This is the sign of the actual change in the relationship between individual and society.

Need, unlike rights, are not the expression of our freedom, on the contrary, they are fundamental, or, in any event, they are constitutive of our freedom, and ,therefore, precede the very rights, so much to have a more essential character for us than these.

Needs, then, are so insuppressible that they need not be claimed, they simply become divulged, or, if it is the case, flung in the face of society with violence.

Needs do not derive from a criticism towards society either, because they belong to the individual (in reality, at times, to the serialized individuals), or to small groups, and, therefore, they are other thing compared to the social requirements of everyone.  Their configuration is more fragmented and does not refer to any possible mediate unity, at the most one can think of an immediate and spontaneous unity.

Fom this conception of needs, phenomenon of corporativization can be thus issued, whose peculiarity consists exactly in the reluctance to accept social and institutional forms of mediation, of accord, of compromise.  Their logic resembles that of the unconscious;  all or nothing, all and at once.

Needs do not recall us to a strong responsability, not even towards ourselves, because they represent instances so vital for man that their eventual incorrect forms of manifestation, or the eventual incongruous forms of appropriation, pass to second class.  We have, likewise, assumed little responsability, because we have found some responsabilities elsewhere, and namely in society, and, in a particular way, in an institutional one, which is guilty of not having satisfied our needs, being completely taken by its power games or by its social alchemies, directed at not disappointing anyone, giving a little to each, but, precisely for this, disappointing everyone.

A minimum plan advances in conclusion, such because the individual, or small groups, cut out some priority objectives for themselves, but such also because it excludes at departure a larger aperture towards the ambit social, rejecting both a larger assumption of responsability and the practice of a deeper criticism and of a more vast range.

Moreover, one may note such an absolutization of individual freedom, for which all is consented to us and does not request justification. The society too legitimizes such a deresponsabilization, both because it absconds itself, it eludes, it shows itself inadequate, and because, by now, modern civilization is substantiated by an indiscriminate opening.

Otherwise, one is reduced  to sustaining that, at a certain stage of one’s life, or because of the influence of preponderant external causes, by this time one cannot be other than what he already is.  So, it is up to he who assumes or claims a greater responsability or a greater coherence on one hand to be more consequent than us, and on other hand to show oneself more comprehensive and tollerant compared to our eventual inconsistencies and contradictions.  In this case, an easy relationship with themselves and with the world is verified, but, this time, not dogmatic, not visibly dominator, even if equally totalizing and simplifying. Here, too, in fact, obstacles and contradictions are not found, neither inside nor outside;  the relations with the outside and the relationships between the faculties proceed according to automatisms and they feed themselves, so that to come out from this prospective, or simply compare it with  others, becomes impossible.  To such  purpose, Fellini warns us about an excessive boldness and says that “for the creative total freedom is ruinous. The artist is a transgressor, he needs contrasts, an enemy” (citation taken from: L’Espresso n. 26 of  2003; p. 135).  To the contrary, remaining dazzled by uncontested fluidity, man becomes his own prisoner, maybe also of that which he began as a game, or, he remains a slave of his own mechanical representation of himself and of the world, without even noticing it, because his complex attititude involves a substantial deresponsibleness towards society, towards the world, towards one’s selves. 

All this, as has been said, requires a redefinition of the relationships between inidividual and society. A redefinition that can occure according to a general criterion, whereby that which is morally condemnable becomes distinct from that which is prohibited, not only morally but also juridically.  In the same way, that which is right and proper should become distinct from that which is obligatory.  Society, therefore, can recommend a different attitude, or it can execrate a certain behaviour, but not always does the moral dissimilarity form a violation of rights or a non-observance of duties.  It is for this reason that a new arrangement of roles and duties of one’s own is imposed.  Society, with the acknowledgement of the amplified autonomy of the individual, has withdrawn from some of its precedding tasks or has left some new possibilities to individual responsability. It has, so to speak, taken a step backwards with one foot.  At the same time, it becomes more and more involved with the extended individuality, and it becomes more and more interested by the large dimensions of certain new phenomenons.  In this sense, society must take a step ahead with its other food.  Keeping one foot ahead and one back, one can to be more stable and also more mobile. In a time of big changes but also of profound apprehension, stability and flexibility are equally necessary.

The distinction of existential levels, the diversification of the moral system and the differentiation of the operative instruments of society, all move in this direction.